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ABSTRACT 
This article makes a case for expanding the scope of current versions of “regional studies” to 
include greater emphasis upon transnational regions as of equal if not greater importance 
compared with an exclusive focus upon sub-national regions. The latter more restrictive 
approach is typically predicated on the continued centrality of state borders against which 
the dominant notion of regions as subnational entities is constituted and reiterated. Drawing 
upon a case study of the African Union our study provides a framework, a critically revised 
Grossraum theory, for addressing the emergence of a new pluralistic and multipolar world 
order characterised by supra-national regions and regional organizations. Traditional 
Schmittian notions of Grossraum are shown to be in need of substantial revision before they 
are able to adequately accommodate and explain the empirical details of our case study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of how slices of territorial space are interpretatively constituted, reiterated, 
appropriated, distributed and shifted, often as a result of the politics and geopolitics of 
practices of governance, is a key one (Agnew, 2013), not least for “regional studies”. It is clear 
from even a cursory review of the overwhelming majority of publications and conference 
papers presented as contributions to the broad and often interdisciplinary banner of “regional 
studies” that this research field is not quite as pluralistic as it might appear to be on first sight. 
In particular, this field operates within an already established interpretive zone: one that is 
opened up and pre-delineated by a certain taken-for-granted understanding of what, for 
these purposes, is being taken to constitute a “region”. With a small number of exceptions, 
the general assumption is that “region” of regional studies has to be interpreted as a subset 
of a nation state, such that a statist framework remains presupposed throughout. 
 
And yet, no self-reflective contributor to regional studies can entirely avoid the qualitative 
issue of how the question of the “regionality of regions” is being both set up and pragmatically 
resolved within the discourse of those engaged in such studies. Perhaps, we need to reflect 
self-critically upon, and even rethink and extend, the prevailing conception of the “regionality 
of regions” in terms of supra-national regions? Our theoretically informed account of the 
interpretive constitution of the “regionality of regions” can, perhaps, be saved from the 
pitfalls of abstraction through a close and critical attention to the implications of empirical 
realities highlighted by detailed and apt case studies of supra-national types of regional 
bodies (Levy, 2011).  
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Our study develops such a case study approach to the geopolitical constitution of “regions” 
with respect to Pan-African institutions centred around the African Union (AU). Two central 
issues arise here: First, the extent to which this and other case studies of supra-national 
regional bodies can be illuminated when viewed through the geopolitical lens of one 
particular theory of regionalism within international law and relations: Schmittian 
“Grossraum theory”. Secondly, what analytical and normative refinements need to be made 
to Carl Schmitt’s theory in the light of whatever we can learn from both the successes and 
instructive failures of its attempted application to these case studies (Ulmen, 1987; 
Bendersky, 1983; Elden, 2010; Balakrishnan, 2000)? We argue that although such theory can, 
in one respect, be interpreted as an instructive failure, it is the very instructiveness of this 
failure that is of most relevance and importance for the conceptual underpinnings of regional 
studies. 
 
Our methodological approach is that of Hegelian “immanent critique”. During such critique, 
we immerse ourselves in the phenomenon itself, and sympathetically reconstruct both its 
nature and main contentions. Then – in the later distinctly critical moment – we expose 
various discrepancies, restrictions and contradictions between what, say, Grossraum theory 
promises in terms of theoretical cogency and empirical insight, and that which it actually 
delivers or – even under ideal cases of applications – is capable of delivering. Having identified 
theory/practice discrepancies, we proposed concrete suggestions to mitigate these 
contradictions, possibly on both sides of the promise vs. performance distinction.  
 
In short, we will be exploring whether a transnational or supra-national “Grossraum theory” 
and analysis, as developed by the controversial German scholar Carl Schmitt (Teschke, 2011a, 
2011b; Balakrishnan, 2011; Koskenniemi, 2013; Salter, 2013; Elden, 2010)1 and developed by 
political geographers, historians (Carr, 1945, p. 52), political theorists (Benhabib, 2012, p. 688) 
and jurists (Mccormick, 2003 pp. 139–141; Schmitt, 1939, p. 303; Schmitt, 1995;2 
Schmoeckel, 1994; Stirk, 1999, p. 360), can contribute positively to an enhanced 
understanding of this founding qualitative conception of “region”. 
 
Our ultimate aim is to call into question the customary premise that the very idea of whatever 
is contingently identifiable as an instance of a “region” (and hence whatever is recognizable 
as a historically specific instance of “regionalism”, “regional”, “pan-regional”, “regional 
studies”, etc.) refers primarily to sub-national regions, either essentially (as if “by definition”) 
or at least by the force of unreflective reiterations of traditional state-centric practices. Here, 
we follow Agnew for whom the practice of (geo)politics constitutive of slices of terrestrial, air 
and maritime space of our planet takes place: ‘across a variety of geographical scales’ and 
involves supra-national institutions and powers exercising sovereign power across national 
borders (Agnew, 2013). To avoid the pitfalls of abstract theoreticism, our argument must 
draw upon historical evidence of the eclipse of the traditionally conceived nation state 
interpreted as the premise of an overly restricted type of regional study prejudiced in favour 
of a conception of “region” that is confined to subnational phenomena. 
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THE PREMISE OF THE NATION STATE AS A COUNTER-CONCEPT FOR SUB-
NATIONAL REGIONALISM 
 
We question the idea that “regional studies” has to rest upon a core – if implicit – conception 
of “region”, understood as a slice of territory subject to governance within a traditional state-
centric or interstate framework3: one whose de facto absolutization of formal state borders 
often neglects the presence and implications of the transnational variant of regional entities 
(Elden, 2011; Agnew, 2009). 
 
Indeed, the last two decades have seen a growing academic recognition of empirical 
tendencies towards market oriented, Neo-liberal globalization, internationalization and 
supra-national regionalism exercising different types of power across state borders. These 
trends have – to a greater or lesser extent – challenged the premises of state-centred and 
interstate orientations towards sovereignty (Hoffman, 1996; Stinger, 2002; Slaughter, 2004; 
Vernon, 1971). Such a restrictive state-centric orientation towards territory had previously 
dominated debates within, for example, international politics, political geography and 
political science (Murphy, 2013; Shah, 2012). Its “allure” has often been at the expense of 
more pluralistic approaches sensitive to regionalised slices of politically constituted spaces 
and territories over which, say, regional institutions, such as the European Commission and 
European Union Council of Ministers, exercise non-traditional forms of “pooled sovereignty”, 
albeit following a theoretically reversible sovereign decision by states to join this regional 
ensemble. Although most legislation arises from domestic politics and institutional processes, 
European Union (EU) law and policy is regularly mediated not only through intergovernmental 
arrangements and national legislation but also by executive decrees with “direct effect” (ECJ 
Case 26/6; Larner, 2011; Allen, 2003). Of course, here we have to recognise on-going tensions 
between the delegation of sovereign powers of governance to the EU, which reached a 
highpoint in the early 1990s, and on-going attempts by nation states to repatriate such 
powers, or to block sub-national regions from dealing directly with the EU other than subject 
to the state’s prior conditions. 
 
Our concern for theorising supra-national regions is not confined to Europe. There is no 
country in the world that exists totally independently from other countries in the region and 
preserves an emphatic nineteenth century conception of national sovereignty. It is clear that 
of the world countries (total 203: 195 + disputed territories) nearly all are members of a 
number of large international organizations, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), the EU, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO, 6 members plus observers), the 
African Union (AU) (32), the United Nations (UN) (193 members and 2 observers), the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (188 member states and the EAEU (Eurasian 
Economic Union) - the most recent regional organisation (01/01/2015) – with 5 member 
states) and the World Trade Organisation (166 members and 24 observers). Each region of 
our world has its own distinctive regional organization uniting almost all its states, and which 
is dominated by one or few “leading powers” and forms a regional power bloc. In cases where 
states are not full members of a regional organization, they are typically members of other 
organizations, such as Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (Bangladesh and Turkmenistan) 
and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Canada and the USA), or are observers to regional 
organizations.  
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Most “regional studies” projects rely implicitly upon a concept of “region” defined sometimes 
polemically against that of centralised nation states, and which is understood as providing an 
alternative devolved or more localised centre of gravity and focus for both decision-making 
and goal-oriented political action. Yet, like any kind of polemically deployed conception, the 
notion of sub-national regions depends, implicitly at least, upon the significance of that which 
it negates. It rests on the premise of the continued relevance of the theory and practice of 
individual nation states. Arguably, it also relies upon a silent negation and displacement of 
any expanded supra-national conception of “region” whose alternative centre of gravity is 
that of transnational regions or power-blocs transcending state borders. Such spatial blocs 
are made up of the territorial spaces of two or more nation states amounting to a 
geographically defined spatial zone encompassing a region of, say, Europe (the original six 
member European Community), Central Asia (SCO), even NATO and Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Schickel, 1993, p. 28). 
 
According to Schmittian Grossraum theory, both international relations, and transnational 
laws aspiring to regulate the conduct of such relations, have been steadily entering into a new 
global order comprising multiple and co-existing regional hegemonic bodies requiring 
coordination. The twentieth century witnessed the emergence of a range of new regional 
entities involving not just cooperation between nation states but also the clear pooling of 
sovereignty – even with respect to military affairs and “security” (Delmas-Marty, 1998; Byers, 
2000; Koskenniemi, 2004; The US National Intelligence Council’s 2010 Report, 2010; 
Yamamoto, 1999; Bouzas, 2002; Laporte & Mackie, 2010; Mansfield & Milner, 1999; Fawcett, 
2004; Vayrynen, 2003; Kosov, 2012, p. 123). Each of these entities possesses its own spatially 
constructed “sphere of influence” within territories whose extent cannot be reduced to state 
borders (Sassen, 2013; Foucault, 2008, p. 77), and operates at an intermediary level located 
between that of the UN and the traditional individual nation state. 
 
For Schmitt, during the past 70–80 years, there has been a historical eclipse of the traditional 
nineteenth-century model of the emphatic individual nation state – understood as a bearer 
of an allegedly individualised, discrete and self-sufficient type of national sovereignty, 
supposedly allowing it to act as a total master in its own house (Schmitt, 2003, p. 211). This 
eclipse has been driven partly by the regulative implications of technical developments in 
communications, military and other technologies, including satellite surveillance and 
cyberspace, and the internationalization of finance and world trade, such as the rise of China’s 
financial power as a major exporting and creditor nation (Sassen, 2013, p. 39). Each of these 
developments has allowed interactions to take place that, to a greater or lesser extent, are 
independent of formal state borders and purely national levels of legal, administrative, 
financial and other forms of regulation. This Schmittian contention receives contemporary 
scholarly support with Agnew identifying: ‘an increasing contradiction between what can be 
called effective sovereignty (exercised by a range of agents)…and claims to legal territorial 
sovereignty (exercised by singular central state authority)’ (Agnew, 2013, p. 2). In addition, 
however, we should not forget the implications of changes within post-Cold War international 
relations previously characterised by the division and imperial assimilation of much of the 
earth between Soviet and US-dominated empires, often at the expense of the development 
of comparatively independent regional developments within Europe, Asia and Africa 
(Luoma-Aho, 2007, pp. 40–41). 
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For Schmitt, the traditional model of the autonomous nation state has, at least in part, 
undermined itself at the ideological level. The idealistic – but essentially fictional – conception 
of a world order comprised of independent, self-determining and equal sovereign states 
properly equipped with equal voting rights within international legal bodies has been 
challenged (Schmitt, 2011, p. 79, 104, 112). In practice, the apparent “idealism” of treating 
each nation state as truly independent self-governing sovereign nations operates to 
undermine the institutional reality of this “ideal”. This is because of the impact of contexts of 
not only differential distributions of global power, wealth and military/nuclear capabilities, 
but also the geopolitical effects within global politics – including the United Nations Security 
Council and other international bodies – of the emergence of controlled “client states”. The 
latters’ foreign policies are, in practice, largely dictated by strategic concerns of regional 
superpowers, which are thereby able by proxy to exercise a backstage form of sovereign 
power, but without accepting the burdens of either responsibility or legal accountability.4 
 
For Schmitt, the traditional state-centric model has been further unsettled by the steady 
growth during the second half of the twentieth century of supra-national forms of regionalism 
and regional bodies and confederations involving a pooling of sovereignty. Examples include: 
the EU, the SCO, and, to a lesser extent, the Arab League, the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf, the AU and ASEAN (Schickel, 1993, p. 28). Such pooling by these other 
states is for example – only regarding economic matters and regional security issues. 
 
Arguably, this historical eclipse of a largely state-centric international ordering has resulted in 
a growing discrepancy arising between traditional state-centric views of international 
relations, and the empirically ascertainable realities of growing regionalist trends within the 
politics and practice of international relations, and hence international law. State borders 
have become relativised as but one among many (geo)political determinants of slices of space 
and politically defined spatial relationships. Such developments have allowed astute 
commentators to refer to the “debordering” of such borders in favour of large “bordered” 
supra-national spaces broadly resembling what we will later characterise as “grossräume” 
(Sassen, 2013, p. 21).5 Arguably, the on-going contingencies of this historically specific 
context provide the rationale for at least a modified form of Schmittian Grossraum analysis. 
 
 
THE AIMS, LEVELS AND IMPLICATIONS OF A GROSSRAUM MODEL OF A SUPRA-
NATIONAL REGIONAL SPACE 
 
This section will first define and clarify the key characteristics of a Schmittian Grossraum 
model of supra-national regions (Blindow, 1999; Proelß, 2003,6 Kervegan, 1999). Next, we 
will discuss the aims and implications of a type of analysis that this model calls for (i.e., 
“Grossraum analysis”). 
 
In brief, the concept of Grossraum (literally “large space”) that is relevant to the “regionality 
of regions” has four major elements (Schmitt, 2011, p. 88): First, a distinct “political idea” with 
which the other member states broadly identify and accept as legitimate on the basis of their 
overlapping cultural traditions (Legg, 2011, p. 101; Salter and Yin, 2014).7 The second element 
is the presence of a shared and express commitment of members of a regional association 
not to deploy sovereign power outside the borders of their “own” recognised spatial region, 
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that is, a doctrine of non-intervention by spatially alien powers (Bailes, et al., 2007, p. 6). Here, 
the pre-imperialist and moderately successful US Monroe Doctrine of 1823–99 provides an 
illustration and possible historical precedent.8 Third, within a viable Grossraum there will 
typically be an acceptance by a regional “leading power” of specific pan-regional security 
responsibilities (CARR, 1945, pp. 73–74),9 which need not itself be a state formation. 
Examples include NATO, and – in other maritime security respects – aspects of the EU 
Commission and EU Council of Ministers. These security responsibilities stem from a voluntary 
pact or formal treaty directed defensively against the threat of unilateral extra-regional 
interference, or – as was clear with respect to the Monroe Doctrine – imperialistic re-
colonization (Schmitt, 1939/2011). The leading power also assumes responsibility for playing 
the decisive role in determining the meaning and scope of applicable regional principles. This 
occurs through either the open and the direct exercise of its executive authority, or – 
sometimes only indirectly – within those “weaker” intergovernmental types of supra-regional 
bodies, which are strongly mediated by national government measures (Salter, 
2012a).10 
 
The fourth defining quality of a Grossraum model of supra-national regionalism is a politically 
defined space, or zone, about which one can distinguish a geopolitically determined “inside” 
from a relative “outside”. This bordered space is protected materially (diplomatically and 
militarily) and, in a sense, dominated by the transnational sovereignty of the major regional 
leading power (Schmitt, 2011, p. 85; Rasch, 2005, Schwab, 1994, p. 186). 
 
The type of supra-national regional analysis that follows Schmittian Grossraum thinking has a 
number of aims. Perhaps, the most emphatic goal is to develop regional studies well beyond 
the restrictive limits of a “state-centred” view of regions stemming from a more traditional 
statist or “interstate” approach. This approach is directed against the sub-national notion of 
region (more precisely multiple potential regions, such as the North West of England, the 
South East and North East of England). All of these are confined to a given state’s borders that 
are typically interpreted as if they were spatially constitutive. To remain self-consistent, 
Grossraum analysis has to reject such a restrictive approach to regional analysis. This is 
because it operates at the expense of any systematically developed recognition of the nature 
and (geo)politics of regional transnational bodies, or power blocs, exercising different types 
of sovereign power “across state borders, whereby such power relativises (or ‘deborders’) 
such borders” (Hooker, 2009, p. 152). 
 
Another major aim is to illustrate the potential benefits for regional studies of recovering a 
strong sense of the “politics of spatiality” (Schmitt, 2011, p. 113). In this context, the notion 
of “politics” is not a distinct realm. Rather, its defining characteristics lie in the intensity of 
relations of association or affiliation. Here, individuals, groups, regional institutions – and 
even clusters of states – form themselves into transnational relations as one another’s current 
“allies”, “neutrals” or “enemies”, in ways subject to both frequent changes and even dramatic 
reversals (Schmitt, 2006; Salter, 2012b). 
 
We can analyse the “politics of spatiality” here at two-levels: those of already constituted 
social understandings of what a region is defined as being (and where it now starts and 
finishes, and its defining qualities and characteristics); and, secondly, the dynamic 
“constitutive” level. The latter refers to that on-going series of interpretative processes of 
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social construction of relations of meaning, relevance and value, which underlie the 
constituted level. In turn, these often dynamic processes continuously generate, sustain and 
sometimes modify each of the categories found within them. These include the socially 
constructed senses of identity and political idea(s), such as the notion of being “a good 
European”. 
  
The vital goal here is to assess the extent to which the on-going processal and contingent 
determination of units of space, with boundaries demarcating their internal space from 
extraregional spaces, is itself typically driven by various contingent and particularistic 
geopolitical factors. These can relate, for example, to the search for extensive regional or 
international influence and securing effective control over resources deemed to be vital to 
realise strategic interests. 
 
In addition, the specifically critical impulse of Grossraum analysis lies in how it seeks to 
develop an alternative post-statist model of legal and other forms of regulation of slices of 
bordered space. This model could prove to be more adequate to the historically specific 
empirical details of how transnational geopolitical relations and regional geopolitics are 
currently operating in practice (Schmitt, 2003, p. 355). 
 
In turn, the proposed analytical model and associated interpretive practices would need to 
address six distinct levels of analysis not found in traditional horizontal interstate models. The 
first level comprises those forms of legal and constitutional regulation of public and civil 
society relations within any given Grossraum that exhibit transnational implications (Schmitt, 
2011, p. 110). Clear examples are competition policies, corporate taxation, drug trafficking, 
transportation and trade policies, including their regulation by means of region-wide 
commissions, courts and tribunals operating in ways akin to the EU’s European Court of 
Justice (Micklitz & Witte, 2012). 
 
A second analytical focus is directed towards the specific constitutional position and public 
law type lines of possible accountability of each “leading power” within a particular 
Grossraum. This is a distinctive issue raised by the unique security, overall coordinating 
responsibilities and associated sovereign rights and capabilities possessed by leading powers. 
It is also necessary for all member states of a supra-national region to clearly know about and 
reaffirm those principles that determine where the scope of legitimate sovereign power starts 
and stops. Member states must also be able to appreciate the nature of the principles 
determining the meaning, scope and limits of power(s) and duties of intervention by the 
leading power, as well as having institutional avenues for assessing and, perhaps, even 
challenging the “constitutionality” of how a particular leading power is deploying region-wide 
sovereignty within any given context. 
 
The third level of analysis relates to the regulation of inter-Grossraum “foreign relations” 
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 111). For example, it is important for scholarship to examine and clarify the 
distinctive implications of region-on-region relations among, say, the SCO and EAEU, and then 
EU and NATO, and the AU. Issues raised by the regulation of such higher level relations are 
clearly not reducible to those between individual member states, that is, their strictly bilateral 
relations and formal treaty obligations. 
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For Grossraum analysis, the fourth level of investigation concerns the bilateral relations 
between the leading powers of each particular Grossraum. We have to analyse the distinctive 
regulative challenges arising where the leading powers enter into, or modify, transnational 
relations when acting on behalf of the region as a whole, for example, when the EU claimed 
to represent “Europe” during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014–15 (Koskenniemi, 2001, p. 420). 
While the EU claimed to represent Europe, this was really the stance taken by its major 
leading states (Germany, France, the UK). However, it could not be said that all the minor 
European states wanted to be represented in this dispute, especially where their economies 
depended on trade with Russia. Contrary to the outdated and formalistic doctrine of the 
“equality of all states”, these regional superpower relationships cannot be interpreted as 
somehow akin to those bilateral relations between other members of different transnational 
regions, for example, between the UK and Algeria. This is because relations between leading 
powers can take on global dimensions and implications concerning, for example, decisive 
geopolitical relations of war and peace, globally significant flows of international trade, etc. 
 
The fifth level of Grossraum analysis relates to the development and enforcement of policies 
of respect for the integrity and comparative autonomy of all those diverse peoples, both 
comparative minorities and majorities, who inhabit particular grossräume (Schmitt, 2003, p. 
211). For example, although Russia and China are leading powers of the SCO, ethnic Chinese 
are a minority group within neighbouring central Asian SCO member states and, as such, 
potentially vulnerable to xenophobic persecution. 
 
The final level of Grossraum analysis addresses the regulative challenges arising from 
contestable issues between two or more grossräume considered as part of a global order 
comprising various regional ensembles (Bailes & Dunay, 2007; Schmitt, 2011, p. 109). 
Examples could include controversies between the EU and the AU over immigration and trade 
policies. Here, the unit under study embraces the differentiated interregional global order as 
a whole. These inter-Grossraum issues could also stem from the presence and aspirations of 
peoples whose traditional “homelands”, themselves understood as primary spaces for the 
realization of a particularistic form of cultural (intersubjective) belonging and modes of spatial 
rootedness indifferent to state-centric national borders, typically span at least two 
grossräume. 
 
Having briefly clarified the six different vertical levels of Grossraum analysis, the fulsome 
elucidation of each could easily fill an entire monograph, it is now both possible and vital to 
consider the various implications for regional studies of carrying out such analysis. Among 
these, we can highlight distinctly normative, policy and scholarly analytical implications. A 
vital task that stems from scholars adopting Grossraum analysis is that of re-framing and re-
adjusting the traditional legacy of state-centred international relations and interactions. 
These need to be revised to better account for the policy and regulative challenges posed by 
the rise of a growing range of regional bodies already discussed above, and which constitute 
a multipolar form of transnational ordering. It is clear that Grossraum principles embody a 
pluralistic model of transnational relations, and the type of legal and other forms of regulation 
these require. Studying these requires our focus to fall upon a grossräume multipolar world 
order comprising a small number of divergent and largescale regional associations and spatial 
blocs, of which the EU is probably the most fully articulated (if problematic) partial 
approximation to date (Mccormick, 2003). (Here, we are identifying little more than a “family 
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resemblance” in that we are not suggesting, and to be self-consistent could not suggest that 
the current trajectory of the EU is somehow pre-programmed and hardwired to develop along 
Grossraum lines.) For Grossraum thinking, these sovereign regional associations operate 
within the specific and unpredictable historical contingencies of on-going balances of power 
and permanently fragile political equilibrium. 
 
In this respect, Grossraum analysis moves away from an ideological conception of a singular 
universe of international relations and their regulation by universalistic forms of international 
law, itself conceived within a statist or interstate manner. Such analysis begins to address the 
regulatory implications of the emergence of a multipolar “pluriverse” of grossräume (Schmitt, 
2006. pp. 53–54). Here, it becomes clear that such a pluriverse consists of a structure of 
territorial divisions between a limited number of regional blocs, themselves stemming from 
an underlying processal ordering process (Schmitt, 2011, p. 109; Hooker, 2009, p. 151–2; 
Mccormick, 2003, pp. 140–41). It is also clear that to constitute and sustain a viable 
constitutive ordering/constituted order, each Grossraum must be required to consistently 
recognise each of the others’ institutional legitimacy and right to exist free from any type of 
extra-regional interventions (Koskenniemi, 2001, p. 420). 
 
Hence, without resorting to so-called “humanitarian” and other forms of extra-regional 
“intervention”, wherever one member state acts inconsistently with core Grossraum values 
constitutive of “mutual respect for difference” by, for example, engaging in sectarian 
genocide, then it can expect to become subject to internal sanctions from the other member 
states. These sanctions could include deployments of diplomatic pressure, economic 
restrictions, military force and “peacekeeping” missions that are both authorised and staffed 
at the regional, not UN, level. Ideally, any such fragile and contingent pluriversal order would 
constantly act to re-affirm an equilibrium and balance of power in ways that were consistently 
constituting and sustaining a pluralistic multipolar reordering of the earth (Schmitt, 2003, p. 
355). 
 
The result of a pluralistic reordering regulated by pluralistic principles would still be a global 
order formally regulated by, say, an overarching form of international law primarily 
addressing inter-Grossraum relations and transnational issues, such as drug and people 
smuggling. However, it would also be a different vertically structured type of legal ordering 
exhibiting deference to the role of law in the intra-Grossraum relations (akin to current EU 
law), while also generally reserving direct international law regulation to inter-grossräume 
spatial orders (Schmitt, 1941, p. 71; Scheuerman, 1999, p. 144). Clearly, this would mark a 
radical break with the purely horizontal nature of more traditional interstate forms of 
regulation presupposed and celebrated by mainstream international law and scholarship. 
 
The pluralistic multipolarity endorsed by Grossraum analysis is not and cannot be politically 
neutral. Rather, it exhibits a defensive yet ideologically polemical orientation towards that 
which it negates (Koskenniemi, 2001, p. 155, 165). This is directed against any type of 
imperialistic orientation seeking to impose a single and homogenising world ordering. For 
example, an ordering rhetorically justified in the name of normative values, imperatives and 
economic models, such as Neo-liberalism and absolutist natural law forms of “human rights”, 
purporting to have a universal relevance, general applicability and timeless truth (Schmitt, 
2011, pp. 109–10). In this respect, the pluralistic dimension of Grossraum analysis, which on 
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normative grounds generally endorses the positive value of a (bio)diversity of different 
cultural traditions while promoting the principles of mutual respect for such differences, 
exhibits decidedly anti-imperialist political implications (Luoma-Aho, 2007, pp. 36–55, 41). Its 
pluralist stance, which combines regional self-interest with more generic normative 
commitments, includes an acceptance and promotion of the decidedly multipolar 
implications of Grossraum analysis. In turn, this commitment entails a clear rejection of a 
singular unipolar principle of global ordering of a would-be and empirically dubious 
“international community” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 355). 
 
Insofar as a unipolarity is implicated in forms of US imperialistic universalism, including 
Neoliberal and Neo-Conservative versions, Grossraum thinking cannot remain politically 
neutral or normatively indifferent (Toulmin, 1990; Monod & Estes, 2013; Habermas, 1996; 
Carty, 2001; Schmitt, 2005; Constellations, 2004; Gowan, 2001; Campi, 1996). At least at the 
ideological level, it deliberately intervenes to counter those universalistic approaches that 
tend to make the: ‘smaller peoples chickens in the kitchen of the cosmopolitan restaurant’ 
(Schmitt, 1940, pp. 178–179). Such intervention is needed because the overall normative and 
policy thrust of Grossraum analysis involves essentially polemical oppositions between the 
following categories: multipolarity vs. unipolarity, pluralism vs. homogenization and mutual 
respect for difference vs. universalistic imperatives towards assimilation. In each of these 
binary oppositions, the former term is given a one-sided priority over its devalued 
counterpart. As a result, and to remain consistent with its own underlying normative value 
system, Grossraum analysis has to develop a sustained critique of the theory and practice of 
all forms of imperialistic assimilation and homogenization stemming from the unipolar 
ideological project of a “one world”, “the international community” or a liberal cosmopolitan 
“new world order”. 
 
Typically, such imperialisms deploy doctrines and devices to impose a single and typically US-
dominated “new world order”. This is often promoted in the name of regional and 
international “security”, the supposedly universal and “natural” order of “liberal democracy”, 
“human rights” and the “rule of law” as promoted by a revived natural rights tradition. By 
contrast, Grossraum analysis develops an essentially defensive type of pluralism. This is 
directed against not only such universalistic ideologies in themselves, but also the typical 
double standards and hypocrisies that inevitably flow from their highly selective 
interpretation, application and enforcement. Here, those interpreted as political enemies or 
neutrals are subject to the negative side of universalistic sanctions for, say, “human rights 
violations;” which apparently do not apply to political friends, who in effect are afforded de 
facto immunities. Here one only has to think of how post-war US foreign policy has applied 
double standards over its reactions to alleged “human rights” violations within Allied and non-
Allied states. 
 
Subscribers to Grossraum analysis will probably seek to re-work its arguments specifically 
designed to combat the universalistic claims of contemporary forms of economic, legal and 
cultural imperialism. In particular, they may adopt a critical stance towards policies endorsing 
“one world” Neo-liberal models of economic globalization, unrestricted circulation of finance 
capital and “one size fits all” conceptions of “world development”. To be viable and remain 
internally coherent, each regional Grossraum must be territorially bounded geographically 
and embrace a particularist form of ideology rooted in its peoples’ distinctive cultural 
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tradition(s) (Hooker, 2009, p. 152). The very particularity, even singularity, of such traditions 
is often the basis upon which cultural–religious barriers can be established between, say, 
where European cultural traditions end and where those of Asia start. In the case of Istanbul, 
this cultural distinction, which should not be confused with “natural borders”, can be 
specified by the two sides of a single stretch of water dividing the European side (Avrupa 
Yakas) from the Asian side (Anadolu Yakas). Religious aspects of cultural traditions, including 
fear of political Islam, may even provide barriers to, for example, the integration of Iran and 
Pakistan into the SCO’s quasi- Grossraum, for example, and Turkey into that of the EU. 
 
To remain coherent at the global level of a possible supra-national ordering of the earth, 
grossräume must work to both achieve, and then respect, a global equilibrium. The latter has 
to be reiterated through a balance of power arising between a small (and ideally an odd 
number) of culturally differentiated regional power blocs (Luoma-Aho, 2007, pp. 40–41). The 
possibility of a generally peaceful – if always fragile and potentially threatened – multipolar 
form of global ordering can only occur where every Grossraum, for its own, often self-
interested geopolitical and strategic reasons, remains committed to respecting following 
three core imperatives: 
 
(1) Principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other grossräume. 
(2) Resistance to all forms of imperialism (including cultural, economic and legal variants or 
forms). 
(3) Principles of mutual respect for those different and sometimes incompatible cultural 
traditions that provide the distinctive integrating principle for each particular Grossraum.  
 
In turn, these imperatives have to be treated as now having transregional validity only within 
a post-statist historical context (as opposed to timeless universal truths). 
 
Grossraum analysis also exhibits an essentially critical orientation: one that renounces as 
spurious a non-political (more precisely “depoliticised”) conception of social scientific 
“neutrality” and value-freedom within, for example, regional studies. Unlike liberalism, it is 
more than capable of taking its own side during its critical engagements with alternative 
approaches. Grossraum analysis is also an expressly politically conscious form of scholarship, 
in the sense of recognising a need for theorising spatial relations as contingent outcomes of 
concrete geopolitical processes. Here, a key focus falls upon the on-going politics of spatial 
differentiation. In other words, Grossraum analysis recognises that on-going political relations 
operate to continuously mediate not only the object of supra-national regionalism, but also 
its social scientific analysis. It accepts, on hermeneutic grounds, the unrealistic and naïve 
nature of claims to value-neutrality within social scientific analysis of, say, a regional 
phenomenon. These are rejected as self-contradictory “prejudices against prejudice” reliant 
upon a naïve conception of value-free description. Naively, the latter’s descriptions are 
typically presumed to remain unaffected by the underlying perspective of the interpreter, 
whose deeply rooted ideological and other normative commitments typically remain hidden, 
and thus evade methodological purging in the name of social science. 
 
A further implication of accepting Grossraum analysis is recognition of a need to develop a 
revised model of the core nature of “the political” that is better attuned to the spatial and 
other politics of regionalism interpreted as an on-going and contested practice. Here, even 
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core scholarly ideas and qualitative underpinnings to the field of regional studies can be 
deployed polemically as (determinate) negations of negated alternatives (Salter, 2012a). 
 
Grossraum analysis also recognises that, throughout its contingent performances, the 
structure of “the political” itself operates to endorse a pluriverse of divergent regional blocs 
in ways that further support multipolarity. Hence, the liberal cosmopolitan dream of the total 
eradication of multipolarity, leading to an undifferentiated “international community” 
centred around the UN in which all decisions are conceived of in technocratic/instrumental 
terms, would result in a form of total depoliticization; that is, the reduction of global 
challenges to purely technical issues within a presumed (but rarely expressly articulated) 
liberal “consensus” as to the ultimate ends of human life. Here, scholarly analysis and 
research would be reduced to the essential unreasonableness of an instrumental means-end 
rationality in which the focus of scholarly attention falls only upon how best to achieve given 
ends in an optimally cost-effective manner. As a result, both the ultimate ends themselves, 
and their underlying normative premises, tend to escape critical scrutiny. By contrast, 
Grossraum theory reinstates recognition of the constitutive role of geopolitics in 
differentiating the global order into “friends”, “neutrals” and “enemies”. 
 
To be credible, Grossraum analysis has to explain historical specific tendencies towards 
regionalism, and the remainder of this study is devoted to a single case study of a region. 
 
 
CASE STUDY: PAN-AFRICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AS 
AN EMERGENT PAN-AFRICAN GROSSRAUM? 
 
It is arguable that, since the formation of the AU in 2002, the African continent, through the 
development of Pan-African institutions, appears – in some but not all respects – to be 
progressing towards an embryonic Grossraum-type model of “regional sovereignty”. This 
section highlights the transformation of Africa from a largely disconnected series of countries 
largely focused on establishing state sovereignty in a post-colonial context, to a group of 
nations seeking (albeit with various and fluctuating degrees of enthusiasm) to forge a strong 
and sustainable regional alliance. 
 
This shift is evidenced in both the formation of the AU, the development of a comprehensive 
peace and security institutional structure, as well as an African Court of Justice. 
 
In addition, Africa’s sporadic quest for regional autonomy is also demonstrated in the AU’s 
growing refusal to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) over the trial of 
African leaders, and calls for the creation of a distinctly African Criminal Court to try 
international crimes (i.e., cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes). This is 
a distinctly regionalist project, developing partly along Grossraum lines, that would make the 
African regional system the first to take over and consolidate at the regional level what was 
previously an “international” criminal law mandate. 
 
Africa’s post-colonial history has been characterized in part, by the “political idea”, in a 
Schmittian sense, of a “Pan-African vision”. This has involved persistent efforts to create a 
unified region of states haunted by a similar tragic past of colonialism and the slave trade, 
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and focused on achieving a “brighter future”. This ideological vision is based on the belief in 
the political idea that: 
 
all Africans have a spiritual affinity with each other and that, having suffered 
together in the past, they must march together into a new and brighter future: a 
future secured, not least, through a common Pan-African security infrastructure 
directed against extra-regional interference. (Emerson, 1962, p. 280) 
 
The latter sentence clearly echoes the Grossraum-style rejection of spatially alien 
interference. In 1981, in response to international condemnations, especially following the 
gross human rights violations of the Ugandan government of Idi Amin, African political leaders 
sought to salvage their image and rectify the situation by adopting an African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Malcolm, 2008). 
 
The Charter projected a more positive (though mainly aspirational) light on the continent. 
However, the weak Organisation of African Unity’s structure and operation prevented 
sanctions and other sovereign-like executive or judicial enforcement actions being directed 
even against states that grossly flouted the Charter’s provisions. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the body responsible in principle for protecting rights on a 
regional basis, could only submit “recommendations” to the AU’s Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government after hearing complaints. It could not even make its findings public without 
obtaining express and prior permission from the Assembly. From a Grossraum perspective, 
this was clearly inadequate and could, at most, be seen as a preparatory, almost entirely 
ideological step towards the achievement of a pooled pan-regional sovereignty coordinated 
by a “leading power”. 
 
After the Rwandan genocide of 1993, which resulted in the death of over a million Rwandans 
after a failed UN Mission, African leaders realised that they had to act to salvage the poor 
security and human rights situation in the continent as a whole. Thus, towards the late 1990s, 
African states recognised the need to modify the existing state-centric principles of non-
interference within domestic affairs by qualifying their previously absolutist doctrines and 
practices of “national sovereignty”. In 2002, they ceded more sovereign control to a newly 
created Pan-African regional body – the AU. Unlike its predecessor, this created an 
institutional structure of governance that not only challenged the state-centric principle of 
absolute national sovereignty but also forged a stronger regional authority closer to a 
Grossraum conception of a “leading power”. That is, an authority capable – in principle and 
within limited spheres – of exercising region-wide sovereign control over aspects of Africa’s 
affairs. 
 
The development of the AU was driven more by the political idea of Pan-Africanism than by 
an economic agenda. In keeping with Grossraum imperatives, this entailed African leaders 
recognising the perceived need to resist extra-regional interventions, and thus reinvented 
African, as opposed to UN “international”, bodies as prime agents for humanitarian 
intervention and civilian protection on this continent (Vine, 2013). Thus, the AU came to 
embody a revived Pan-African ideological vision being developed, in part, through polemical 
negation of pseudo-universalism. Its main practical aims have been to address Africa’s 
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insecurity and perceived “underdevelopment”, and to create a sense of more assertive supra-
national entity and spatial zone (Vine, 2013). 
 
In terms of the vital practicalities and institutional executive structures responsible for the 
region-wide sovereignty of an emergent leading power, the AU created an African Peace and 
Security Architecture comprising the Peace and Security Council (PSC), Continental Early 
Warning (CEW) System, African Standby Force (ASF) and Military Staff Committee, Panel of 
the Wise (POW) and an African Peace Fund (APF). The PSC is the political decision-making 
body, the POW a mediation and advisory body, the CEW an analysis centre, the ASF a military 
element, with the APF providing a special fund to cover costs (Vine, 2013, p. 97). Such 
attempted regional security guarantees, which are embedded in a pan-regional security 
framework, represent a necessary requirement of a Grossraum, especially as foreign 
interventions are usually justified on the pretext of resolving state conflicts. 
 
In an encouraging development from a Grossraum perspective, the AU and African 
subregional communities signed a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding in 2008, 
with the aim of enhancing and streamlining their cooperation on the implementation of the 
continent’s wider peace and security agenda (Vine, 2013, p. 18). Thus, the African regional 
system takes the unique form of a system not necessarily dominated by one or two hegemons 
but strengthened by existing sub-regional communities, offering the prospect of a more 
devolved federal structuring.  From a Grossraum perspective, a succession of AU “peace 
missions” involving security related interventions within member states represent an evolving 
and assertive form of supra-national regionalism: one that is aware of its security 
responsibilities and willing to formulate and mobilise sovereign power even in difficult 
contexts. 
 
As discussed above, for effective regional governance, there is also need for the provision of 
effective regional executive mechanisms, including possibly legal/constitutional institutions, 
for the peaceful resolution of intra-Grossraum disputes between members. Prior to the 
formation of the AU, African leaders were still attached to an absolutist conception of national 
sovereignty and the view that the African concept of dispute resolution involved negotiations 
and conciliations, as opposed to adversarial or court systems (Naldi, 2002, p. 12). This position 
was incompatible with the idea of regional civil, criminal and constitutional courts exercising 
binding adjudicatory powers and final judgments over member states. It effectively derailed 
the establishment of a Pan-African human rights court to enforce the African Charter akin to 
role played by European Court of Human Rights. 
 
However, the advent of the AU has seen a change in stance towards regional strength, 
allowing the creation in 2001 of the AU’s African Court of Justice (The ACJ’s Constitutive Act 
2001), largely modelled on the International Court of Justice, to adjudicate on matters of 
transnational law between member states. Furthermore, in 2004, AU member states adopted 
a protocol providing for an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) to 
supplement the human rights work of the Commission. Even before the courts had started 
full operations, it was decided to merge the two into a single “African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (ACJHR)” comprising the Human Rights Section and the General Affairs 
Sections. While still awaiting the necessary ratifications for the ACJHR to come into force, 
certain global developments (mainly disagreements with the ICC) caused the formation of a 
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committee to look into the possibility of creating an additional criminal chamber in the 
proposed ACJHR 
 
Within Africa’s quest for region-wide forms of pooled “sovereignty” broadly akin to the 
Grossraum model there is clearly a political motivation linked to concerted resistance to the 
exercise of extra-regional sovereignty by supposedly universal hegemonic “international” 
institutions, particularly those dominated by former colonial powers. This polemical tendency 
is clearly present in the AU’s strained relationship with the ICC over the trial of African leaders 
(Murungu, 2011, p. 1067, 1069). Irked by the ICC’s decision to carry on with the indictment 
process, in 2009 the AU directed the African Union Commission to assess the implications of 
recognizing the jurisdiction of the African Court to try “international crimes”, that is, as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Murungu, 2011; Akokpari et al., 2008). 
 
The AU’s insistence on developing a regionalist, as opposed to an internationalist, response 
to atrocities means that its relations with the ICC have become even more strained over the 
trial of Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, and Deputy President, William Ruto. The AU has 
even accused the ICC of bias and “race hunting” (Bbc News, 2013). At a session of the AU 
Assembly, Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, re-affirmed a supra-national political idea in the 
Grossraum sense. The latter involves a conception of regional sovereignty interpreted as 
necessary both in principle and in practice to counteract the perceived humiliation of Africans 
becoming subject to “extra-regional interference”, and the double-standards characteristic of 
the application of pseudo-universalism (African Union, 2013).11 
 
Kagame’s position points towards two focal points of the Grossraum model of regional 
sovereignty. Firstly, the fight against extra-regional imperialistic interventions within Africa. 
Secondly, the mission of creating a regional body with sufficiently wide powers to preclude 
any need for extra-regional intervention, most emphatically in a form that prompts 
perceptions of renewed Western imperialism. It is this belief of Africans being “singled out” 
for humiliating treatment as a mere “object” of global governance that has led African leaders 
at an extraordinary session of the AU Assembly in October, 2013, to pass a resolution that 
African Heads of State shall not appear before any international court during their term of 
office (African Union, 2013). 
 
As a sovereign union not allowing interference by foreign bodies that are not part of the 
regional entity, Africa has met the Grossraum requirement in the formation of both the AU 
and institutions such as the APSA and African Court of Justice (Møller, 2009, p. 57). Certainly, 
with respect to the bounded regional space, we can identify the entire African continent 
(except Morocco) as this extended transnational spatial zone. All continental African states 
are also members of the AU, allowing the Grossraum to have contiguous borders. The AU also 
meets the characteristic of possessing a distinctive core “political idea” capable of 
differentiating one region from another – at least to the extent that a Pan-African ideology 
(“African Solutions for African Problems”) mentality animates many developments. However, 
this “political idea” appears to be stronger when it is united and directed against extra-
regional intervention but far weaker on issues raised by interstate relations within Africa. 
 
Grossraum theory also suggests the existence of a “leading power” to pilot and coordinate 
the affairs of the Grossraum. However, in the African case, it is far from clear whether there 
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is such a clear leading power. There is certainly no executive body equivalent to the EU 
Commission and EU Council in which region-wide sovereignty resides. The African case is also 
peculiar in that the sub-regional bodies which existed prior to the formation of the AU still 
play crucial economic and security roles on the continent. Thus, the workings of the AU have 
been described as being based upon an ephemeral group hegemony (Møller, 2009, p. 57). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear from any careful cross-referencing of the AU case study to the Schmittian theoretical 
model set out above that, at most, Schmittian Grossraum analysis can provide an agenda for 
raising a range of vital questions and for sign-posting a number of key of topics to help with 
the structuring of spatial analysis of regions. What it cannot do is to prescribe, from on high 
as it were, a fixed number of characteristics that any regional body somehow “must” exhibit 
to match a dogmatically conceived and projected criterion of a “true” supra-national region. 
Any attempt to prescribe empirical or institutional content in this way would surely amount 
to a violation of the normative pluralism and analytical contextualism of Grossraum analysis, 
as well as its reliance upon contingent historical materials. 
 
The fact that the first Grossraum, the USA under the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, relied upon a 
single leading state does not mean that the AU (or even EU or SCO) cannot, in principle, be 
considered a Grossraum because the role of a “leading power” is exercised by an executive 
body or intergovernmental structure, as opposed to a nation state. In this respect, it is 
possible that Schmittian Grossraum theory possesses certain Eurocentric elements insofar as 
it is predicated on the idea that the era of state building has now come to an end. However, 
across much of Africa, there still remains considerable enthusiasm for state building and 
actively enhancing – as opposed to pooling or delegating “upwards” – the powers and 
obligations traditionally associated with emphatic forms of national sovereignty. 
 
During our cross-referencing of Schmittian Grossraum theory with the AU case study, it has 
become clear that the former needs to be substantially adapted. Indeed, the limits of the 
classic formulation of the Grossraum idea and empirical analysis of region-wide regulation 
become especially apparent when we try to apply and illustrate each strand of this model to 
our case study and – in the course of this attempt – discover certain discrepancies and 
resistances. In other words, we need to emphasise those contexts where either certain 
aspects of the distinctly regional qualities of the AU overshoot, or significantly differ from, the 
prevailing Grossraum model – even to the point where any assimilation of these bodies into 
the Schmittian theoretical framework would involve the interpretive violence characteristic 
of an uncomfortable “forced fit”. 
 
Viewed in a more positive light, our reflections on the results of such cross-referencing 
provide considerable resources for a future project of constructively revising and adapting 
this Schmittian theory, expanding it in some areas, contracting it in others and purging the 
model of various questionable Eurocentric assumptions. For example, the idea that there will 
be only one regional “leading power” equipped with unique responsibilities for pan-regional 
security and self-defence. 
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Another lesson from our comparative cross-referencing is that Grossraum theory raises a 
series of vital issues for every attempt to analyse supra-national regional bodies. What it can 
usefully contribute is a response to four key questions: First, how are transnational forms and 
modes of sovereignty, in effect, sovereign power, currently being exercised across an entire 
supra-national region, and by means of which institutional executive power or powers? Here, 
the “leading power(s)” issue could prompt a range of critical institutional questions, not least 
concerning constitutional accountabilities and the enfranchisement and political 
representation of distinct peoples whose traditional homelands span two or more national 
borders of member states. Where there are huge refugee movements the question arises as 
to which Grossraume will be responsible for their allocation, and how agreement can be 
reached between leading powers. Second, within any particular historically specific era what 
issues arise as to the geographical scope of any “given” region? And how are the borders of 
this region being constituted, sustained and revised, possibly through the exercise of the 
politics of spatial relations resulting in territorial reiteration, expansion or contraction? 
 
A third issue that Grossraum analysis highlights is: by what means are groups of all kinds 
culturally integrated into a historically and socially defined region to the point that regional 
characteristics both feature in, and permeate, aspects of their sense of identity as, for 
example, “fellow Africans”? When addressing processes of integration within any given 
Grossraum, what is the empirical balance among culture, social welfare, economic interests 
and security concerns as factors promoting relative regional integration (or relative 
disintegration)? And can this combination of contingent factors be credibly understood in 
terms of a unifying “political idea” (or – more realistically – complex of related ideas) by 
reference to which the identity of the region itself is reiterated? 
 
Fourth, how are the various strata of vertical relations within Grossraum being regulated by 
rules and principles of law, constitutional provisions and institutional policies and practices, 
including those of courts, tribunals and commissions of various kinds? And how – and by what 
means and to what effect – are such processes of region wide regulation now taking place 
between two or more grossräume? Here, the question of the role of public institutions, such 
as courts, and the possibilities of public law challenges may be underplayed in Schmittian 
Grossraum theory, as our AU case study shows clearly. 
 
At the same time, our AU case study casts some critical philosophical light on even the most 
sympathetic reconstruction of a Grossraum model, at least insofar as this is understood as 
resting upon a complete rejection of universalism and a relativistic endorsement of both 
cognitive and normative pluralism without limits. Contrary to Schmitt’s apparently blanket 
polemical critique of universalism, a consistent regionalism informed by Grossraum theory 
must advance its normative arguments at least as having a general validity, and claim that 
doctrines of “respect for difference”, multipolarity and regional self-determination free of 
extra-regional interventions by other powers are not wholly particular to a given time and 
place. We would suggest that the critique of universalism within regional studies can only be 
directed towards that spurious sub-type which is specifically unilateralist and unipolar in its 
orientation. In turn, this leaves the possibility open, not least for its own foundations, of a 
more genuine universalism (Benhabib, 2012). However, this would have to be confined to a 
thin level of general regionalist principles lacking substantive content and, perhaps, detailed 
prescriptive implications. For example, over the question of whether there must be one or 
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two “leading powers”? Or whether self-consistency means that security cooperation can only 
ever be a purely intra-Grossraum concern? Or whether the imperative of “balancing” and the 
quest for a peaceful form of multipolarity is better realised through overlapping memberships 
in regional security regional bodies, together with a range of bilateral relations whose 
dynamics tend to be supportive of equilibrium both in themselves and particularly when 
considered together? 
 
There is also the difficult issue concerning whether even the core defining structural features 
of a Grossraum are historically specific and contingent, or whether they possess a 
transcontextual (if not universal) validity? For example, is the prohibition of extra-regional 
forms of sovereign intervention, that is, the basically anti-imperialist dimension of Grossraum 
theory, a merely contingent feature with a limited shelf life? It is not possible to be dogmatic 
on this point. However, the idea of self-governing regional arrangements equipped with their 
own regional security apparatuses, courts and systems of governance does seem to 
presuppose a general commitment to regional autonomy from imperial subordination. 
Indeed, every example of a successful Grossraum to date, and the results of our own analysis 
of the AU as a Grossraum-like entity, point in this direction. 
 
Arguably, although there can be all manner of contingent variations concerning the factual 
details of how the core structures are developed and revised, the structures themselves retain 
a transcontextual solidity, going to the essence of the very idea and historical rationale of a 
Grossraum. The idea of a Grossraum lacking effective sovereignty within its own borders, and 
with large parts made up of “client states” of an extra-regional superpower, such as the USA, 
is surely a contradiction in terms. Arguably, a similar point applies to the other core structural 
features, the existence of a specified zone with identifiable borders defining what is inside 
and outside the region, and – but perhaps to a lesser extent – the existence of a core political 
idea on whose basis “friends”, “enemies” and “neutrals” are contingently specified, and the 
presence of a leading power (which may or may not be, a singular state acting as a regional 
superpower but can be an agency akin to the EU Commission and Council of Ministers). We 
would argue that the latter two structural features are open to greater contingencies than 
the first two. This is because they operate at the level of the practical realization and 
reiteration of the Grossraum project. 
 
Universalism both generally, and with respect to universalistic “human rights” and liberal 
democratic ideologies, tends to be portrayed by Grossraum thinking as if it were inherently 
homogenising, unipolar and potentially imperialistic. At most this is a half-truth. Indeed, once 
set up in this polemical way, we are faced with a conception of a threatening ideological 
enemy who embodies diametrically opposite values to those of pluralism and decentralised 
multipolarity that defenders of Grossraum analysis promote. In other words, universalistic 
ideologies, particularly those that are endorsed by liberalism and Neo-liberalism, supply the 
polemical and ideological enemy of Grossraum thinking that operate as a foil against which it 
seeks to justify its position. Given the rhetorical importance of this ideological “enemy”, it 
would be naive to think that Schmittian Grossraum analysis can ever provide an even-handed 
and fair assessment of rival universalistic positions. 
 
There are also the well-known dangers of Schmittian Grossraum analysis falling prey to 
performative contradiction. That is, making claims in a form that contradicts the substance of 
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what is actually being claimed. Here, we can highlight a problem whenever Grossraum 
analysis advocates pluralism in a manner that it is not itself pluralistic. For example, where 
the virtues of a pluriverse (more precisely a multipolar “pluriversalistic” global ordering 
involved a small number of grossräume) are presented as universal and globally applicable as 
distinct from being specific to the particularistic and distinctive “political ideas” of any specific 
region. Clearly, at least at the level of normative claims, this would involve a performative 
contradiction insofar as pluralism and multipolarity have been deployed polemically against 
universalistic policies associated, for example, with a human rights agenda or the project of 
an international criminal court (Sassen, 2013, p. 33). 
 
It is, therefore, important for Grossraum analysis to engage in a sustained self-critical practice 
of actively seeking out empirical examples of contexts where political ideas that are important 
to regional integration transcend that region itself. In other words, to identify 
counterexamples that cannot be so easily assimilated into a particularistic regional ideology, 
such as Pan-Africanism. Here, we cannot ignore how aspects of an international human rights 
framework have been adapted as part of the Pan-African agenda in terms of a “responsibility 
to protect”. The pluralistic element here lies not in the values in themselves, such as a general 
respect for imperatives relating to humanitarian protection of peoples from civil war and 
genocidal dictatorships founded on the right to life and freedom for torture, etc. Instead, it is 
exhibited in a refusal to allow extra-regional powers, including the ICC, to selectively interpret 
and apply these in ways that appear discriminatory and hypocritical. 
 
In sum, we would suggest that we are currently witnessing the emergence of a distinctly 
multipolar and regionalistic world order that may, to a greater or lesser extent, be intelligible 
in terms of classic Grossraum theory, which makes important claims for the preconditions of 
peaceful coexistence. However, our analysis suggests that such theory needs to be subjected 
to a number of substantial modifications before it can be considered to provide a useful lens 
through which to make sense of current trends towards supra-national forms of regionalism. 
These revisions will be ongoing as further case studies, such as those relating to the EU, the 
Eurasian Economic Union, the Arab League, are developed in the near future. What has been 
shown from the AU case study (and a related SCO case study published previously Salter & 
Yin, 2014) is that this theory still has the capacity to prompt a series of challenging questions. 
It is able to organise analytical concerns that – taken together – can enhance our 
understanding of fundamental analytical and geopolitical issues relating to how the 
“regionality of regions” is both set up and sustained as a process. Only by means of later case 
studies perhaps in relation to the EU, the Eurasian Economic Union, NATO and ASEAN, we will 
arrive at less provisional conclusions about the potential practical relevance of adopting a 
revised form of Grossraum theory. 
 
Viewed in a positive light, our reflection on the cross-referencing of such case studies to the 
Schmittian Grossraum model provides considerable resources for constructively revising and 
adapting this theory. This involves expanding it in some areas, contracting it in others that we 
have highlighted, while also purging this theory of various possibly outdated or otherwise 
contextually inappropriate Eurocentric assumptions. For example, the idea that there will be 
only one regional “leading power” equipped with unique responsibilities for pan-regional 
security and self-defence is challenged by AU’s overlapping security institutions and 
commitment. 
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NOTES 
 
1. Schmitt is highly controversial, not least because of his three-year period of collaboration 
with the Nazi government between 1933 and 1936, which has prevented his ideas receiving 
a fair hearing in their own right. It may be many decades before the contemporary relevance 
of Schmitt’s work can be soberly assessed akin to that of Weber, Hobbes and Morgenthau, 
and in ways that avoids the twin pitfalls of apology and biographical reductionist attack that 
are hermeneutically naive in the sense of failing to realise that the significance of his work 
today is reducible to his original intentions because the present provides the frame of 
reference for reinterpreting the significance of the past. See SALTER (2013) for a further 
development of the argument that it is the contemporary analytical and explanatory power 
of Schmitt's arguments—as opposed to moral judgements upon the political choices of the 
author — that is of primary importance. 
 
2. Schmitt’s analysis of Grossraum and related spatial issues is largely contained in the articles 
brought together in the post-war collection entitled Staat, Grossraum, Nomos: Arbeiten aus 
den Jahren 1916–1969, includes the following noteworthy studies: ‘Raum und Grossraum im 
Volkerrecht’, 234–68, ‘Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung’, 269– 320; ‘Die Raumrevolution: 
durch den totalen Krieg zu einem totalen Frieden,’ and ‘Die letzte globale Linie,’ 441– 48 
(Schmitt, 1995). 
 
3. RSA Conference 2014 Catalogue and articles; www.regionalstudies.org 2010–2014 search 
keyword – ‘region’. Total: 205 + 26 = 231. In terms of sub-national conceptions, these papers 
addressed 40 countries, 46 cities (39 + 7) 62 (51 + 10) different regions (including islands and 
provinces). In terms of comparisons between sub-national and other regions, there were 
many examples, including, EU/European regions: 14; EU as an organization: 4; Supranational: 
2; Mediterranean region: 2; USSR: 1. Other sub-national conceptions include 11 studies 
addressing EU/ European regions: (8 + 3). In terms of the deployment of a supra-national 
conception of regions, there were only nine examples (8 + 1). Of course, there were other 
variants too with 18 studies which could not be distinguished and classified in these binary 
terms (14 + 4). Four other studies could only be considered “mixed”, with the remainder 
indeterminate. 
The universal definition of the concept of ‘region’ does not exist as division of space into 
regions depends on area of studies and formulated problems. A designation of the borders of 
a region and its signs in most cases depends on goals and the methodic base of a study. 
(Anzaurovna, 2006) 
 
4. NATO members and the former Warsaw pact satellite states of the Soviet empire sping to 
mind here as examples. 
 
5. Sassen (2013) is noting how: 
It is a debordering that constitutes new types of bordered spaces inside national territory 
itself. These may …cut across state borders…they are distinct albeit partial jurisdiction not 
generated by or dependent on the state itself…they make legible asymmetries between the 
state’s sovereign jurisdiction and the territory itself. 
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6. The relevance of Schmitt’s Grossaum theory is addressed more fully in the German-
language literature. Proelß (2003) addressed connections between this theory of Großraum 
and the modern EU concluding that the differences were more significant than the similarities 
in that the latter remains too diverse, decentralised and market-oriented policies to be 
understood as a Grossraum. 
 
7. Each Grossraum is shaped ‘the leading powers, whose political idea radiates through a 
specific Grossraum and who specifically exclude the intervention of alien powers into this 
Grossraum’ (Legg, 2011). 
 
8. US President James Monroe first introduced the Monroe Doctrine in his seventh annual 
State of the Union Address to Congress on 2 December 1823. See 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/content/monroedoctrine- 
speech.htm) (accessed on 5 July 2014). 
 
9. The terminology here is important. The wider term “leading power” which could 
accommodate a higher level regional executive authority responsible for some aspects of 
governance and administration is perhaps more appropriate. Carr once suggested that 
immediate post-war Britain could – if it only shed the spatially incoherent British 
Commonwealth – play the role of the “leading power” of a Western European Grossraum. 
 
10. Regional & Federal Studies 20(3), (2010) Special Issue: ‘Studying regions as ‘spaces for 
politics’: Territory, mobilization and political change; creating new spaces for politics? The 
role of national minorities in building capacity of cross-border regions. Mccormick’s (2003) 
rather rosy and idealistic account of how the EU also differs from a Schmittian Grossraum is 
contestable on my reading of the latter, as if there is no anti-Americanism in European 
culture, desire to appropriate aspects of Eastern Europe, or that the “central” powers of 
France and Germany are not currently dominant forces within the geopolitics of the EU. 
 
11. In his statement to the 21st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Addis Ababa, 
26 May 2013 Paul Kagame said “We cannot support an ICC that condemns crimes committed 
by some and not others or imposes itself on democratic processes or the will of sovereign 
people. Such a court cannot facilitate reconciliation which is a vital precursor to peace. […] 
The need to build our own capacities on the continent to address criminal justice calls for 
crucial and urgent steps – in particular the Africa court of justice should to be strengthened 
and supported. 
[…] “It is not in the interest of the ICC, the Security Council, the African continent and 
relationships between the 
three, to see further humiliation of African people and their leaders by an unfair criminal 
justice system.” – the text of the statement can be read here: 
http://www.paulkagame.com/index.php/speeches/1088-statement-by-he-paulkagame- 
president-of-the-republic-of-rwanda-at-the-21st-ordinary-session-of-the-assembly-of-the-
union 
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